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by 
David Charters 
More than a year has passed since Lord Mountbatten was assassinated by an 
IRA bomb in the Irish Republic, and more than a decade since Catholic-
Protestant communal violence brought British troops to the streets of Northern 
Ireland. In his article on the British political initiative of 1979-80 Michael 
McDowell expressed the view that the situation would not wait long for some 
definite action on the restoration of self-government to the troubled province.' 
In July 1980 the British Government took a cautious step in that direction. This 
latest proposal calls for another attempt at power sharing between the two 
communities: an 80-seat assembly elected on the basis of proportional 
representation, plus one of several models of executive which would give the 
Catholic minority a voice in decision-making at the highest level. Westminster, 
retaining ultimate responsibility for the province, would control taxation, 
foreign affairs and, above all, security.2 Reaction from the various political 
factions thus far has not been encouraging. Clearly, early agreement on this plan 
or any variant is not likely. If it fails, the long-term problem will remain 
unsolved, although the immediate effects may be quite small. If agreement is 
achieved, the province may develop sufficient political maturity and strength 
over the years to isolate and eventually eradicate the men of violence. The 
question of Ireland's future, as one or as two communities, could then be 
discussed in a rational and constructive manner. In the short term, however, a 
settlement within the framework proposed — which implies the continuation, at 
least for the time being, of a separate political entity in Northern Ireland — may 
raise the level of violence, as Irish nationalists attempt to destroy this challenge 
both to their immediate goals and to their raison d'être. Meanwhile, the troops 
are still on the streets and the conflict continues. This article presents an analysis 
of the war itself. 
The Terrorists 
The principal terrorist organization operating in Northern Ireland is the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), although the Irish National Liber-
ation Army and the Protestant para-military groups should not be discounted 
from the violent equation. The PIRA is closely linked to Provisional Sinn Fein, 
a legal Republican (Irish nationalist) political party which has its headquarters 
in Dublin. The strategic objective of the Provisionals (whether IRA or Sinn 
Fein) is to remove, through the use of violence, the British civil and military 
presence in Northern Ireland and to reunite North and South as a single 
"socialist" republic.3 However, apart from vague references to non-alignment, 
nationalization of key industries and "a community of communities"4 the exact 
shape of the Provisionals' intended socialist state has never been made clear. As 
Peter Villiers notes, "The niceties of political debate they left, and still leave, to 
the future."5 Instead, they have concentrated on the campaign of violence 
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intended to remove the British, seemingly to the exclusion of all else. 
The security forces currently estimate the strength of the PI RA at 
approximately 350 hard-core activists — the gunmen and bombers and their 
commanders and staffs — with some 2-3,000 supporters, those who will provide 
safe houses, steal cars and collect funds for the movement.6 Up to 1977 the 
PI RA maintained (largely for propaganda purposes) a pseudo-military 
structure of brigades, battalions and companies, although these titles bore no 
relation in terms of strength or organization to conventional military forma-
tions. In fact, operations were carried out by "Active Service Units", small 
teams of usually less than six men. Command and control was in the hands of a 
Chief of Staff, the Army Council and a headquarters staff.7 The organization, 
distributed geographically around the province, originally rested on a solid base 
of popular support (tempered by intimidation) within the Catholic areas, 
particularly in Belfast and Londonderry. But after the indiscriminate shooting 
and bombing of 1972 and the British Army's removal of the PIRA-controlled 
"no go" areas, popular support lessened. Life under the Provisionals had not 
been pleasant: ordinary citizens, not the security forces, were the principal 
victims of violence. British initiatives, such as the ending of internment and 
efforts to improve housing, may have contributed as well to a shift in public 
opinion. Consequently, by the mid-1970s the Provisionals had moved their 
command and administrative base to the South and the security forces were able 
to penetrate the organization in the North, arresting many remaining members. 
Defections further depleted the ranks.8 
Borrowing undoubtedly from the experience of more sophisticated terrorist 
groups such as the Italian Red Brigades the PI RA adopted in 1977-78 a smaller 
cellular structure and introduced a more selective pattern of recruiting. This new 
organization appears to be flexible: in Belfast, for example, PI RA cells are not 
permanent. Instead the organization draws upon a pool of gunmen to create a 
new cell, of five to ten men, for each operation. The cell is briefed on its task, no 
names are mentioned and the cell members disperse after the operation. Nor are 
the cells tied to a limited geographic area: they may operate anywhere in the 
city. This smaller and tighter organization has much less contact with the local 
population and is, therefore, less open to penetration by the security forces.9 
The relative security of the cellular structure is one of the key factors which 
will determine the PIRA's ability to sustain a protracted campaign. They seem 
able to recruit, train and retain a level of membership sufficient to ensure 
organizational stability and continuity and to preclude early extinction. 
However, because of the decline in popular support, the PIRA probably cannot 
expand without endangering its security and structural integrity. The Provi-
sionals may claim as they did in 1976 (presaging perhaps their structural 
change) that "a revolutionary movement does not depend on a popular mandate 
as a basis for action. Its mandate comes from the justness and correctness of its 
cause and therein lies the basis of our mandate."10 Such arguments may be 
intellectually satisfying, but the hard fact remains — the smaller organization 
cannot sustain a level of violence high enough to render Northern Ireland 
ungovernable and thus force the British Government to relinquish control of the 
province." 
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Finance is an equally serious problem. The PI RA has a budget estimated at 
£2-3 million annually. This pays for members living "underground", for support 
of families whose imprisoned relatives are taking part in the"H-Block" protest, 
as well as for infrastructure support (safe houses, transport and above all, 
weapons).12 But both the American and Dublin governments have publically 
denounced Irish-American fund raising efforts and contributions from America, 
through the Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID), have fallen substan-
tially.'3 This has forced the Provisionals to rely more heavily on purely criminal 
activities — extortion and armed robbery — to finance their operations, but this 
has brought problems of its own. Funds raised through extortion and protection 
rackets have been diverted to the pockets of members, producing a degree of 
internal rivalry and violence. Furthermore, such methods have done little to help 
regain support amongst people who might otherwise be sympathetic to the 
cause. Armed robberies have become more hazardous in the altered security 
atmosphere of the North. Consequently, the Provisionals have carried out an 
increasing number of armed robberies in the South. This, in turn, has brought 
upon them the wrath of the Irish Government.14 
This does not mean that the PI RA is a spent force. It remains an efficient, 
dangerous organization, capable of attacking targets effectively. Its members 
are now well-versed in terrorist techniques and have an adequate supply of 
weapons. They are becoming more skilled in "intelligence" work, cracking the 
army's codes, monitoring their radio channels and tapping the telephone system. 
As shown by the murder of Mountbatten and of the soldiers at Warrenpoint last 
year, PI RA bomb-makers have become more sophisticated. The increased 
technical expertise has been accompanied by a shift in tactics: targeting is more 
selective. The indiscriminate bombings of the early 1970s have given way to a 
form of economic warfare — bombing of selected commercial establishments. 
The one-shot sniper and the electronically-detonated mine have replaced the 
loose gangs of gunmen who would fire at the security forces from behind a 
screen of demonstrators. Attacks on the security forces concentrate on prison 
guards, police reservists and the part-time soldiers of the Ulster Defence Regi-
ment. The PIRA has also extended its operations to Europe, attacking British 
servicemen in West Germany.15 In South Armagh, where the Provisionals retain 
their highest level of local support, the terrorists pose a considerable threat to 
the security forces. Here the conflict takes the form of a rural guerrilla war, with 
the terrorists striking at random from across the ill-defined border.16 But large 
parts of the province are demonstrably untouched by the war. At the time of the 
author's visit in early August, there had not been a snooting in Belfast since May 
— when a PIRA cell had been captured. Many North American cities would be 
envious of such a low murder rate. Quite apart from the internal changes in the 
capabilities of the Provisionals, the reduction in the level of violence is due in 
large measure to the effectiveness of security force operations. 
The Security Forces 
The security forces consist of elements of the regular British Army, the 
locally-raised part-time Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) and the police force, 
the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). There are currently based in the 
province eleven regular army units, totalling some 11,000 men and women, little 
more than half the total present at the peak year of 1972. Six of these are 
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"resident" units, stationed in Ulster for two years, the soldiers accompanied by 
their families. The remaining five are "roulement" units, deployed into the 
"hard" areas for 4½ month tours. There they are paired with a resident battalion 
to ensure continuity in the exchange of information and experience. The regular 
troops are organized into three brigades, each responsible for a geographic area 
corresponding approximately to police regional and divisional areas. The 11 
battalions of the UDR, totalling some 7,300 men and women, are deployed 
across the province in the brigade areas. In much of the province (from North-
west to Southeast), the UDR carries in cooperation with the RUC the primary 
responsibility for security. This frees the regular troops to concentrate on the 
areas where the terrorists are most active. The RUC, with a regular strength of 
about 6,700 (and a reserve of 4,600) operates from stations across the province.17 
For both political and internal structural reasons the RUC proved unable to 
contain the communal violence which flared up in 1969 and from 1970 the 
regular army carried the brunt of the war against the terrorists. The RUC in 
this early period carried out normal police duties outside the "hard" Republican 
areas and supported the army with intelligence and other functions. As the force 
recovered its confidence it became more actively engaged, and extended the 
areas patrolled. In 1977 the security forces adopted the "Way Ahead" strategy, 
the central theme of which is "police primacy", that is, the RUC would take 
over primary responsibility for law enforcement; the army would adopt a 
supporting role.18 
This task has been made easier by several developments, the first being the 
establishment of close cooperation between the police and the army. Such 
cooperation had not alway been present in the past, although it tended to work 
better at the lower levels than higher up. Intelligence is now pooled centrally and 
the army and police decide jointly how to exploit it. Joint army/RUC commit-
tees meet regularly, the brigadier in each area meeting at least once per week 
with his opposite number in the RUC. This closer working relationship has 
been enhanced, first, by the cordial personal relationship between the GOC and 
the Chief Constable, and secondly, by the appointment in autumn 1979 of a 
Security Coordinator. After the Mountbatten/Warrenpoint incidents, the 
British Government offered the security forces a "Supremo" to run the entire 
political and military campaign. The security forces did not feel such a drastic 
change was necessary. It would have negated the role of the Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland — whose political input is important — and the appoint-
ment of a "high profile" leader might have created the impression that major 
political initiatives were afoot, at a time when everyone recognised that move-
ment had to be undertaken cautiously. What they did ask for and received was a 
kind of arbitrator who, by his independence, could mediate disputes over oper-
ational policy and coordinate the army/police response to terrorism. Sir 
Maurice Oldfield, formerly head of DI6 (Secret Intelligence Service) was called 
out of retirement to take on this task and, though he was given no executive 
powers, he was able to exert a positive influence on army-police cooperation.19 
The second major development has been the great increase in cross-border 
cooperation between the RUC in the North and the Irish police (the Garda) in 
the South. Always subject to political whim south of the border, this coopera-
tion is now at an all-time high. One reason for this is the rising crime rate in the 
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south — a direct product of the cross-border nature of PI RA terrorism — and 
the consequent casualties to the Garda in clashes with the terrorists. The Irish 
Government has come to realize that its police force has not been geared to this 
kind of problem. A second reason may be political. The new Prime Minister, 
Charles Haughey, faces an election within 15 months. He must do something 
about the faltering Irish economy and about the rising crime rate. Improving 
cross-border cooperation with the North could help to solve both problems — if 
increased police activity reduces the crime rate and the cooperation produced a 
quid pro quo from the British Government on the economic front. 
Whatever the reasons, the cooperation takes several forms: the two chief 
constables meet once per month and both forces have appointed border commis-
sioners who meet regularly. The Garda maintain five squads along the border, 
two of which are guaranteed to be there at any one time. The RUC and the 
Garda keep in touch by radio. British army helicopters are allowed to overfly 
the border in "hot pursuit" of, for example, a suspect vehicle. Furthermore, 
both governments are enforcing extra-territorial jurisdiction, which means that 
persons suspected of committing crimes in the north or the south may be tried in 
either area. The key political factor in cross-border cooperation is that the 
emphasis is on combatting "crime" — the Garda do not see themselves as help-
ing the British security forces defeat republican terrorism. This "depoliticiza-
tion" of terrorism makes security cooperation politically acceptable in the 
south. 
For the security forces the operational tasks have not changed a great deal in 
the ten years of combat with the PIRA. Defeating the Provisionals means first 
finding them, no easy task where civilian and terrorist can look alike and PIRA 
reorganization has reduced the flow of information. Thus, intelligence-gathering 
remains the principal task, carried out by means of observation posts, random 
vehicle check points and patrols on foot, in vehicles and in helicopters. Constant 
patrolling allows the soldiers and police to become familiar with the people and 
routines in their areas, and to develop the very necessary "sixth sense" that will 
warn them that something unusual is in the offing. Joint patrols with the RUC 
help to establish a police presence in some of the tougher areas; in quieter parts 
of the province the police are able to patrol on their own. This visible security 
force presence, always on the move, also helps to disrupt the freedom of action 
of the PIRA by increasing the risks that members, weapons and explosives may 
be caught in transit. But even in the main cities the overt presence has been 
considerably reduced. The change is most noticeable in Londonderry where only 
a few years ago several battalions were deployed in the Bogside and the 
Creggan. Today only one reinforced company is deployed west of the Foyle. 
The reduction in the scale of the regular army commitment and the shift to 
"police primacy" had been accompanied by a significant change in operational 
technique: increased reliance on covert operations, principally for intelligence 
gathering. 
The 22nd Special Air Services (SAS) Regiment, the Army's elite counter-
insurgency unit, has been in the vanguard of the change to covert action. 
Although not introduced in squadron strength until January 1976, individual 
members of the regiment served in intelligence staff positions in Ulster from 
1972. Specialists in clandestine operations, their skills honed to a fine edge in 
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Borneo, Aden and Oman, they also trained soldiers from conventional units in 
the art of "undercover" patrolling and surveillance. Today, these soldiers carry 
out an increasing share of the covert operations. In 1976 an SAS squadron was 
introduced into South Armagh. There the ill-defined border and local sympa-
thies gave the Provisionals considerable freedom of action, to the point where 
they virtually established a "liberated area" and where sectarian murders 
threatened to produce Protestant reprisals on a major scale. The level of 
violence fell dramatically after the arrival of the SAS. Usually operating in four 
man teams, they laid several successful ambushes against the PIRA. The SAS 
presence was apparently expanded to two squadrons by 1977 and recently covert 
operations have been extended to other parts of the province.20 
This change in operational method has not been without its problems. The 
role of the security forces in Northern Ireland is to restore and maintain the rule 
of law. Soldiers and policemen are subject to the law both individually and 
collectively. A soldier cannot shoot an armed terrorist, unless his own life is 
imminently threatened, without risk of prosecution.21 But, as I indicated in an 
earlier study of covert action in post-war Palestine, "special operations by their 
very nature are conducted in a legal and moral twilight zone; if control or disci-
pline fails, they become merely a guise for counter-terror which reduces the 
government and the security forces to the status of criminals. Secret police 
methods make bad propaganda — if the cover if 'blown', and tactical victories 
may be squandered by a strategic defeat."22 For both the politician who 
approves them and the soldier who carries them out, they are dangerous opera-
tions. The SAS has "sailed close to the wind" on several occasions, the shooting 
of teenager John Boyle and the unauthorized crossing into the Irish Republic 
being cases in point.23 It is a credit to the high standards of training and disci-
pline within the SAS, and amongst the regular soldiers they have trained, that 
such dubious incidents have been infrequent. It is also a measure of the success 
of the covert action program generally that the few lapses have not undermined 
politically the pacification process. 
Future Prospects: War Without End? 
Clausewitz's axiom that war is a continuation of politics by other means is 
central to insurgent conflicts. Nowhere is this more true than in Northern 
Ireland, where politics and violence are inextricably linked, the one reinforcing 
the other. Clearly, a military solution to the conflict cannot succeed (short of 
some kind of Carthaginian peace) without a concurrent political solution. No 
such event is yet in sight. The social problems, prejudices and polarisation 
remain. Overcoming these difficulties, by far the more important, is at best a 
long-term prospect. 
What then of the war? Has it not reached a deadly stalemate wherein the 
Provisionals cannot maintain a high level of violence without risking destruction 
of their organization and where the security forces cannot reduce them further 
without overstepping the bounds of legality and legitimacy? The spectre of end-
less low intensity war is hardly encouraging. One officer offered this assessment 
during my visit. "No one is saying they see a light at the end of the tunnel. But 
we are willing to concede that there may be a light there." 
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A CRITIQUE OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA: 
ARGENTINA, URUGUAY AND BRAZIL 
by 
Richard Gillespie 
In the two decades since the 1959 Cuban Revolution, the magnetism of 
revolutionary warfare has attracted many young Latin American radicals, 
disillusioned with the reformism of traditional Left parties. Though the 
"lessons" drawn by the continent's combative Left from the Cuban experience 
were always questionable, armed struggles are still being waged in several 
countries, stimulated by the Sandinista triumph in Nicaragua last year. The 
urban guerrilla strategy itself became fashionable in the late 1960s, after the 
1967 death of Guevara in Bolivia and a number of rural guerrilla defeats, and 
soon made an impact out of all proportion to the numbers enrolled in guerrilla 
ranks. In Argentina, above all, peak individual guerrilla operations by 1975 
were characterised by the mobilisation of hundreds of combatants, the extortion 
of multi-million pound kidnap ransoms and scores of casualties. But in no 
country did urban guerrilla strategies prosper in the long term and it is the aim 
of this paper to account for their failure. 
"Urban guerrilla warfare" should not be confused with "terrorism", 
especially when the latter term serves as a pejorative. It can be best defined as 
"a form of unconventional war waged in urban or suburban areas for political 
objectives"1 and differs from political terrorism through being more 
discriminate and predictable in its use of violence. Its frequent equation with 
terrorism is facilitated by the fact that urban guerrillas seldom reject terrorism 
as one of several forms of action, and indeed tend to use it extensively when they 
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